

FOREIGN POLICY bulletin



AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 8

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Responsibility of American Nationalism

by Henry Steele Commager

In his penetrating essay on nationalism, published in the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* on October 15, Hans Kohn observed that "the moral standing of the West in the eyes of the world is very much the concern of the United States." Similarly we can say that the moral standing of nationalism itself is very much the concern—and the responsibility—of the United States. This is true, not because the United States is the most powerful of modern nations, but because American nationalism has been predominantly benign rather than malign.

The United States emerged into nationalism at the same time as France, Belgium, Greece and other late 18th- and 19th-century national organizations. As a result, we tend to read the history of American nationalism in universal terms. But American nationalism differed profoundly from that of the Old World, and such differences influenced its course.

First, the United States developed nationalism without statism, without that deification of the state so common on the Continent and which in Germany evolved into a cult. Americans began, rather, with suspicion of the state, a suspicion which has never wholly evaporated and which makes a religion of the

state quite inconceivable in this country.

Second, the United States developed nationalism without a church—that is an established church linked inextricably to the state. Ours was the first major nation of the West to try the audacious experiment of separating church and state. We have only to recall the role of the church in Spanish nationalism, or in Irish, or—in our own day—in Arab and Jewish nationalism, to realize the significance of the American decision.

Third, the United States developed nationalism without an aristocracy or a ruling class. American nationalism, unlike that of most—although not all—European countries, came from below rather than from above. It was not the product of a church which identified its interests with those of the nation, or of a monarch, or of an aristocracy or of an intellectual elite—and it did not have to pay the heavy penalties of such associations.

Fourth, the United States developed nationalism without a military establishment, or even a military class. Again we need only look at the role of the military in French nationalism, or German, to appreciate what we escaped here. American nationalism never

JANUARY 1, 1958

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
345 EAST 46TH STREET • NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

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had to take on a predominantly military character and therefore never presented to other peoples or nations the kind of threat associated with so many of the military nationalisms of the Old World.

Closely related to this fourth consideration is a fifth: American nationalism developed without persistent national enmities. It is almost impossible to think of Irish nationalism except in terms of England, and no one can doubt that France helped create German nationalism; Austria, Italian; Russia, Swedish; and Denmark, Norwegian, just as in our own day Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia and other new nations draw some of the juices of their national life from their enmities. We did have Britain as a national enemy, but two wars which we regarded as victories disposed of that, and although Mexico has, with reason, regarded the United States as an enemy, the United States has never seriously reciprocated. Our almost hysterical preoccupation with Russia in the last decade or so suggests something of what we escaped in the past.

Sixth, we have largely, although not entirely, escaped nationalist history. While almost everywhere in the Old World, history was used for nationalistic and even chauvinistic purposes, American historians, from George Bancroft to our time, showed very little interest in national history. Our greatest historians—Prescott, Parkman, Motley, Mahan, even Henry Adams—did not address themselves primarily to national history, and there has never been a na-

tionalist school of historians in the United States, as there was in Germany, France and Norway, and as there is in Russia today.

No Intellectual Control

Seventh, the United States developed nationalism without national control of education and indeed without any formal control of the intellectual content of education. We have only to compare the American situation with that taken for granted in 19th-century Europe—with the highly centralized education of France, for example, or of Humboldt's Prussia or of Austria—to realize what we escaped. It has never been possible for any government or any party or any class (except briefly in the ante-bellum South) to use the schools as instruments of policy.

Finally, the United States developed nationalism without establishing a national cultural pattern—and this because there was no national cultural pattern to establish. Most societies that set up as nations insist on a national language, literature, art and philosophy, and usually discover these in the deep—and romantic—past. As the United States of 1789 had no past, no language, no art, almost no history or traditions, it was not under pressure to resurrect these and impose them on successive generations. Americans, therefore, almost wholly escaped the ravages of cultural nationalism. That nationalism, even today, would displace English with Erse, Danish with Norwegian *folksmaal*, Swedish with Finnish. It cultivates cultural parochialism and

nourishes spiritual and intellectual vanity.

During most of its history, then, the United States did manage to avoid the worst ravages of nationalism—political, military, religious and cultural. Better than any other major nation, then, it is in a position to guide and instruct the many new nations which have emerged over the historical horizon in recent years. Most of these are cultivating the worst, rather than the best, features of nationalism—imitating the Old World nationalism of the 19th century with its military antipathies, its ecclesiastical prejudices, its cultural parochialisms.

We are in a better position than any other major nation to make clear the dangers of this kind of nationalism and to encourage a more enlightened and benevolent one. We can do this by cultivating and developing those activities which transcend national barriers. For perhaps the first time in history mankind is in a position today to apply the machinery of communication on a world scale in order to enlist men and women of all classes, all colors, all faiths and all talents, in the work of civilization, to develop the potentialities of science and technology and extend their blessings to every quarter of the globe. We can do this only if we ourselves transcend nationalist barriers.

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Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: JOHN S. BADEAU • BENJAMIN J. BUTTENWIESER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMENY • AUGUST HECKSHER • MRS. W. HOUSTON KENYON, JR. • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE • ANNA LORD STRAUSS. JOHN W. NASON, *President*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*; NEAL STANFORD, *Washington Contributor*; GWEN CROWE, *Assistant Editor*. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

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What Security in the Rocket Age?

After some confusing statements and false starts the Eisenhower Administration is getting around to meeting Russia's satellite and missile challenge. But the United States cannot expect to overtake the U.S.S.R. in satellites and missiles in a matter of weeks or months.

Fortunately, however, the Capital, the Congress, the Administration are now largely aroused to the implications of Soviet superiority in these fields. There is no more talk of Sputnik being "a nice scientific trick," a "silly bauble" or "just an outer-space basketball."

The Senate's Preparedness subcommittee, with Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Democrat of Texas, as chairman, has already taken enough testimony to make clear that the U.S.S.R. has gained the jump on the United States in missile and satellite development. No one is debating any longer whether the Russians are ahead, but how far ahead they are. Today the vital, important question is, What to do about it?

The Administration has already done a few things to show it means business. It has put both IRBM missiles—the Army's Jupiter and the Air Force's Thor—into production without waiting to thoroughly prove either. It has upgraded the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, moving it out of the Office of Defense Mobilization into the White House and appointing five new members. It has transferred the Air Force's long-range missile program to the Strategic Air Command (SAC). And it has put the ICBM program on "overtime". Also, as the President announced in his first "chins-up" speech, there is now a

White House special assistant for science and technology, Dr. James R. Killian—although he is not the "missile czar" that many feel is needed.

But, relatively speaking, this is all "chicken feed" compared to what has to be done if the United States is to catch up, not to mention overtake, the U.S.S.R. in these fields.

What Must Be Done

It is obvious more money has to be spent. General James Harold Doolittle, chairman of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, testified that there had to be "an immediate substantial increase." The Administration has let it be known that it will be at least \$2,000,000,000 more—and Congress may fix the amount even higher if all the things that need to be done are carried out in production, research, education.

Another thing that must be done, says Dr. Edward Teller, "father of the H-bomb" and foremost nuclear scientist, is to relax secrecy. The situation "absolutely requires" the fullest cooperation with our allies, says Dr. Teller. We may lose some secrets in the process, he acknowledges, but he is sure we will produce more new secrets faster by cooperating or sharing our scientific wisdom.

Then there is "inter-service rivalry." The President and others have tended to belittle this as a source of trouble in weapons development. But Dr. Vannevar Bush, wartime head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, testified that inter-service rivalries were "damaging and disgraceful," and he called for a drastic overhaul of the military missile program.

The Central Intelligence Agency's

boss, Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in turn made a strong plea for better scientific education, pointing out that the Russians are already training more engineers and scientists than the United States.

So there is a wide choice of things to be done by the Administration if it is to make sure that the United States remains a first-class power in this rocket age.

But possibly most important of all, there must be dynamic, vigorous leadership by the President himself, who must insist that these things be done—not just proposed. One of the most revealing bits of testimony at these hearings was that given by Allen Dulles, who insisted his CIA had for years warned the White House about Russian advances in technology, science, missiles. But he added with a shrug that his reports never seemed to get much attention.

From now on what is needed is not more accounts of what the United States has done, but accounts of specific actions and decisions. Most of the daily headlines about defense programs, speed-ups and so on concern intentions, blueprints, not action.

At the hearings the Soviet breakthrough in the missile and satellite field was compared more than once to a space-age "Pearl Harbor." And there is every reason to believe it is going to take some of the "blood, toil, tears and sweat" that followed Pearl Harbor to win this outer-space cold war.

NEAL STANFORD

(This is the second in a series of eight articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1958"—What Should U.S. Do in a Changing World?"—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)



Europe: Partner or Rival?

The outcome of the heads-of-government conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Paris on December 16-18, called at the height of the West's anxiety about the launching of Soviet earth satellites, is bound to leave a deep imprint on relations between the United States and Western Europe. It is among the European nations, heirs, like this country, of Western civilization, that the United States has found the staunchest allies in a common struggle to check the spread of Russia's power and influence. Yet today two questions are openly asked on both sides of the Atlantic: Will the 15 NATO members hold together or will they drift apart? And if they drift apart, will Europe cease acting as our partner in world affairs and assume an independent role, and even become our rival, particularly in trade?

One thing seems clear amid the murk enveloping the future of NATO. If the alliance is not to disintegrate, it must be integrated much more closely than at any time in the past—not only militarily, but also politically and economically—and perhaps most important of all in terms of common ideas and convictions. And if such integration is to take place, strong leadership will have to emerge from within NATO ranks.

Such leadership, it is hoped, will be given by President Eisenhower, who alone, it is felt, could galvanize NATO. His illness, and the resulting need for reduced activities on his part, dramatically underlined the central problem of the alliance: the problem of finding an individual who could persuade the member na-

tions to sacrifice their special interests, in Europe or elsewhere, to the paramount need for common action.

Can NATO Be Integrated?

If Western Europe is to become a partner of the United States in every sense of the word, all NATO members will have to subordinate their sovereignty. They will, in effect, have to form a closely knit intergovernmental organization instead of the present loose coalition held together primarily by national military commitments. Before the appearance of the Russian sputniks, the United States had played the role of "first among equals," exercising the right to withhold from our allies the knowledge we had achieved about atomic and hydrogen weapons for fear that such information might leak to the Russians. Now that the Russians have shown that they possess the information we have, and perhaps more, the Administration is ready to share nuclear data with our allies and to supply them with nuclear weapons.

The United States, however, is not yet ready to take the political steps toward NATO integration urged by some of our allies, who want us to consult with them in advance about policy decisions, not only in NATO, but also in other areas of the world. France has raised this issue in the case of the United States and British arms deliveries to Tunisia and has found strong support for its views in West Germany and Italy. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, has indicated that the United States must retain the right to make its own decisions about issues that might involve us in war.

This means, in effect, that instead of creating a supergovernment for the Atlantic Community, the individual nations insist on the right to veto policies which they regard as inimical to their interests. Nor has the United States indicated that it is ready to accept the course long urged by Canada—to develop closer economic cooperation between NATO nations, as provided in Article 2 of the alliance treaty.

Unless the United States alters its own policies, then, the most that can be expected is a streamlining and modernizing of allied military arrangements to meet the needs of missile strategy. In short, the NATO structure would remain that of a limited partnership.

Will Europe Become Threat?

If the Western European nations should find such an outcome disappointing, will they turn away from NATO and, instead, concentrate their efforts and resources on the creation of an independent entity of their own—a European union, which has long been the dream of many on the Continent but is still far from realization? Such a trend emerged after the Suez crisis, when Britain and France, disillusioned by American intervention against them, began to think in terms of greater independence from the United States. And Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of Germany, a strong advocate of European unity, has expressed qualms about what he regards as the instability of American foreign policy, urging Europe to assume a more independent role.

If Europe should overcome the ob-

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The Philippine Elections: New Trends

by David Wurfel

Mr. Wurfel, a research fellow in the Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, is a part-time instructor in government at Wells College. A Ford Fellow in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, 1955-56, he has published articles and reviews on the Philippines in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, *Far Eastern Survey* and *Pacific Affairs*.

THE fourth postwar Philippine presidential election of November 12 was unique in four respects. (1) Victorious President Carlos P. Garcia, leader of the Nacionalista party (NP), won with a minority—41 percent of the vote; (2) the successful Liberal vice-presidential candidate was of a different party from the presidential winner; (3) a party without representation on the precinct boards of election inspectors, the Progressives, was credited with more than a million votes; and (4) a major typhoon swept the island of Luzon—which has 47 percent of the registered voters—on election day. The election was not unique, however, but rather followed the trend of the last six years in being relatively bloodless and honestly administered.

Despite the typhoon one million more people went to the polls than had gone in the bitterly fought 1953 election; and despite the greater turnout, the administration's power of patronage, the adherence of more than two-thirds of all local elected officials—who traditionally instruct their followers how to vote—the distribution of public works funds and of a few million pesos of private monies to buy votes, Garcia received only about three-quarters as many votes as had the late President Ramón Magsaysay in 1953. Garcia had promised to continue Magsaysay's program, but his 32 years in politics marked him as "old guard," and the people felt doubts about his promises. Judging from the nearly hysterical grief of the Filipino masses at Mag-

saysay's death last March, it is doubtful whether, for them, anyone could have filled his shoes. His name dominated the campaign, but none of the candidates who used it could fully appropriate his popularity.

Magsaysay's drive for honesty in government, his support for reform programs and rural development, and his careful administrative attention to the complaints of the small man created among his people a faith in government and a hope for the future which had been previously unknown in the postwar Philippines. But his tragic passing left the nation once more starkly aware of the continuing problems of monetary instability, unemployment, rising prices and land hunger.

Garcia Shows Independence

It was in this gloomy atmosphere that Vice President Garcia had become president last March, as a result of the smooth functioning of constitutional succession. In 1953 he had been nominated for the vice-presidency because he hails from the Visayas, the southern islands, a traditional requirement when the presidential candidate is a native of Luzon in the north. As Magsaysay's secretary of foreign affairs, he faithfully followed the administration's pro-American line. But Garcia was not in Magsaysay's "inner circle" and had no personal following in the ruling Nacionalista party outside his own province. His political acumen after he became president, therefore, came as a surprise to most observers.

Starting in May against more than

half a dozen strong contenders for the NP presidential nomination, including the unsuccessful 1949 candidate, Senator José P. Laurel, he won the NP title early in August on the first ballot in the most ostentatiously immoral political convention that Manila has yet seen. Garcia in large measure transformed the provincial NP machine into his personal instrument. He can now say he won without the support of some of the older politicians who claimed they had "made" Magsaysay. This may give him a certain amount of independence in the future. At a time when he should have been currying the favor of all potential backers, in June, Garcia provided another surprise by vetoing a bill pushed by the powerful "sugar bloc," which in the granting of favors to exporters would have nearly destroyed the Philippine foreign exchange control system and thereby the government's most potent weapon for influencing the pattern of investment. There was talk that this move might hurt his election chances, but he gained favor with the importers and their allies while at the same time acting swiftly and effectively to ingratiate himself again with the "sugar bloc." He loaned a new 6 million pesos to planters through the Philippine National Bank—to which they were already heavily indebted—and supported the president of the National Federation of Sugar Cane Planters for a senatorial nomination. As a result, "sugar money" went to Garcia. The president also showed some strength of purpose in refusing to

sign another bill which would have defeated the aim of the Land Reform Act of 1955—that is, distribution of government-acquired landed estates to the cultivating occupants.

At the same time the pre-election Garcia administration made important compromises with conservative interests. And various other of its activities dissipated the aura of honesty which Magsaysay's puritanism had lent to his administration—even though he had not converted all his administrators.

Economic Deterioration

By September 1, according to Alfonso Calalang, president of the Bankers Association of the Philippines, "collusion and manipulation in the pricing and shipment of imports and exports" had reached crisis proportions, costing the Philippines nearly as much in foreign-exchange receipts as had been feared from the bill which Garcia vetoed. Monetary reserves have dropped to an all-time low. Fear of further decline of the peso is the cause of such illegal activity; actual decline is its effect. The black market price of United States dollars is now 30 percent above last year's 2.80 pesos despite the official 2 to 1 rate.

During the campaign, at least, Garcia strongly supported the stand of Central Bank Governor Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., on "devaluation never." The Nacionalista party, however, retains within its fold strong competing elements of producers for export, producers for local consumption and importers. When election post-mortems have been completed, the "great debate" over devaluation and foreign-exchange controls which plagued the Magsaysay administration will again emerge. Governor Cuaderno, the most vigorous and effective defender of present controls, it is rumored, is on the verge of re-

tirement. Sooner or later, when he does retire, some policy changes are likely to occur.

Influence of Church

The second unique feature of the election, the victory of the Liberal party's Diosdado Macapagal in the vice-presidential race with 45 percent of the vote, while the party's presidential candidate, José Yulo, was defeated with 28 percent, has sometimes been explained, inadequately, merely as a victory of pro-Americanism, over anti-Americanism. It is certainly true that the taint of anti-Americanism has never helped national candidates in the past. The defeat of Nacionalista vice-presidential candidate Speaker José Laurel, Jr. seems to follow this pattern. But anti-Americanism has never before been the crucial factor in a candidate's defeat, nor was it in 1957.

Macapagal, an obedient Catholic layman, had the support of the Catholic Church. By contrast Laurel, who was very influential last year in helping to push through the House of Representatives a bill requiring the reading of José Rizal's famous, but strongly anticlerical, novels in all public and private high schools, won the enmity of the Church. The hierarchy let it be known in various ways that Laurel, Jr. was *persona non grata*. One was the announcement by two Nacionalista Senators who were elected with strong, overt Church backing in 1955 and had been unofficial spokesmen for the hierarchy in the past that they would refuse to campaign for Laurel, although continuing to back Garcia. To counter this move, Garcia appointed the national commander of the Knights of Columbus as secretary of education and, like other candidates, made a point of hearing mass in the church of every town he visited. When Speaker Laurel was in

the party accompanying Garcia, a few Bishops were reluctant to proceed with the service.

Liberal party publicity about the support it was getting from the Church was so open toward the end of the campaign that the papal nuncio publicly denied that the Church officially supported any party. But the Catholic clergy's personal preference for Macapagal was probably decisive. In the presidential race clerical preferences were less sharply focused.

Vice-president elect Macapagal, 47, is as outspokenly pro-American as was Magsaysay, and his years of service on the House Foreign Affairs Committee gave him practical experience in dealing with Philippine foreign-policy problems. Despite these excellent qualifications and the Philippines' young tradition of appointing the vice-president to be secretary of foreign affairs, party lines may keep Macapagal from that post, for which there are many Nacionalista applicants.

The third unique element in the 1957 elections indicates that the traditional picture of Philippine politics as a power struggle among ambitious conservative leaders in general agreement on policy questions, who combine in shifting coalitions to win public office, is no longer entirely accurate. Magsaysay cracked this traditional image by introducing the power of charismatic leadership based on direct contact with and active concern for the rural masses. It now appears that the cracks cannot be repaired, at least as long as there are sincere men who can duplicate Magsaysay's attitudes and techniques.

This has been made clear by the success of Manuel Manahan, chairman of Magsaysay's Presidential Complaints and Action Commission—in effect a presidential assistant for righting wrongs throughout the country and later a graft-busting col-

lector of customs. Manahan campaigned last November as the "new Magsaysay," convincing over a million Filipinos that he would fulfill their expectations. Unlike Magsaysay, who had a well-established party machine to bolster his personal appeal for votes, Manahan started with almost no political organization. Magsaysay had confided to many friends his intention to form a new party out of the best elements of the old ones, but these plans were cut short by his death. Manahan built on the core remnant of the Magsaysay-for-President movement, kept alive since 1953 mainly by the energies of Magsaysay's secretary of labor, Terry Adevos, and called the new party, "Progressive." Early in the campaign there were reports of coalition negotiations with the Liberals, but some say the Liberals refused to "clean house" as the Progressives wished, so the talks failed.

Role of Manahan

Manila-born, 41-year-old Manahan, coming from a Spanish speaking middle-class family and educated at the elite Ateneo de Manila run by American Jesuits, was able to sell himself to rural people by adopting Magsaysay's campaign techniques. With the aid of a friend's helicopter he shook hands in more towns and villages than had Magsaysay. In the cities his rallies were larger than those of any other candidate. His speeches struck out at the old parties as symbols of "feudal exploitation" or "the dying power of bossism" in a way that made Magsaysay's 1953 campaign look mild in comparison. The campaign had considerable enthusiasm but little money.

Although he ended in third place nationally, with 21 percent of the vote, Manahan led in 7 provinces, mostly in Central Luzon, and won second place in 16 provinces and

Manila. The Progressives elected no congressional candidates. No party composed completely of "outs" has lasted long in the Philippines. But with capable leadership and a distinct social program it is to be hoped that the Progressives will be different. Manahan has already indicated that they would put up candidates in the 1959 election for 8 senators and all 52 provincial governors.

The other new party which was formed for this election, the Nationalist Citizens party of Senators Claro M. Recto and Lorenzo Tañada, may have more staying power than the Progressives, since, besides electing one man to the House, its presidential and vice-presidential candidates remain in the Senate. And it retains a unique ideological emphasis: nationalism. The first stages in the development of nationalism always include considerable antirealism, and Filipino nationalism is still in its first stages. Thus Recto is dismissed by other than his friends as merely anti-American. Nationalism can have a positive content—this, however, is not Recto's strong point—and does have a wide appeal among the educated middle-class even outside Recto's party. But, as the Senator correctly lamented—after receiving less than 9 percent of the national vote, winning only in his own and his running mate's home province—his kind of nationalism has little appeal for the rural people. Recto, a successful corporation lawyer, had a record of opposition to land reform and lack of interest in other social reform measures, which was not designed to garner votes among the "masses." No impartial observer had expected him to win.

The typhoon reduced the expected vote by almost 1 million, hurting those candidates without sufficient organization or funds to provide voters with transportation to the

polls. But the fact that 30 percent of the voters nevertheless supported candidates with little organization and who had no representatives on precinct poll boards is a tribute not only to social unrest and ideological ferment but also to honest election administration.

Political Progress

Tremendous progress has been made since 1949. Six years ago it was considered utter folly for a party to enter a campaign without representation on the poll board—the law allows only the two largest parties such representation. It was feared that any party without an official inspector would be cheated. But the Commission of Elections, with the assistance of civic organizations, has created sufficient trust in the voting and tabulating process to dispel that fear, thus encouraging new groups to enter the political arena. Never before did four important national figures contend actively for the Philippines presidency. It is a healthy trend which will ultimately result in a realignment of Philippine parties, with distinctions based on ideology and economic interest.

Pending such realignment the Philippines will have to muddle through politically. The Nacionalista party won six out of the eight Senate seats at stake and three-quarters of all House seats (a larger majority than before). But this does not necessarily mean that Garcia will get congressional support for his program. Much will depend on the skill of his personal leadership. The need for effective foreign-exchange control—no matter what the peso-dollar ratio—channeling of capital into productive investment, more employment opportunities and more rapid land reform are all pressing problems for the new administration, and all require a minimal level of honesty in

administration. Performance up to election day was not entirely encouraging. Now that President Garcia is freed from many short-term political worries, he should have time to deal seriously with these problems. The record of Magsaysay will, on the whole, provide him with a good model.

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Spotlight

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stacles which have hitherto blocked unity, will it become a rival of the United States? At the present time there is no prospect that Europe would emerge as a military threat to this country—unless, of course, it comes to be dominated by Russia. But some American observers fear that the common market Europe is striving to create might become a threat to our economic interests if it leads to the establishment of a common tariff with rates higher than those of the tariffs of individual countries.

But there is still a third alternative.

This is the possibility that Western Europe, without becoming either our partner or our rival, might decide to adopt a position of neutralism between the United States and the U.S.S.R., maintaining good relations with both but giving no support to either.

Will Europe Go Neutral?

Neutralist sentiment has long existed among some Europeans who fear the consequences of the Continent's involvement in a nuclear war. This sentiment has been strengthened by Russia's display of its skill to produce rockets capable of delivering missiles to long-distance targets. The neutralists recognize that Europe is not capable of defending itself against an attack by Russia without United States aid, but they discount the danger of such an attack and in effect say, "Count us out of a nuclear war between the Big Two." Moreover, some spokesmen in NATO countries—for example, Canada's foreign minister, Sydney E. Smith and his predecessor, Lester B. Pearson—are disturbed by Washington's tendency to say *nyet* to Moscow offers of negotiation. Others, notably younger leaders of the German Social Democrats who, after losing the 1957 national election, have won significant victories in municipal polls, suggest that NATO should give the United States a free hand to

negotiate a settlement with the U.S.S.R.

Strong support for the cause of neutralism was given by George F. Kennan, former American ambassador to Moscow, who in his series of London talks over the BBC said that the West should rid itself of the "obsession" of a Russian attack on Europe; urged the neutralization of Germany as the only way of unifying that country and stabilizing the continent; and opposed the distribution of American atomic missiles to the NATO countries on the ground that this would foreclose Russia's withdrawal from Eastern Europe and any hope of a settlement.

As events have turned out, the most significant problem for discussion at the NATO conference may be the proposal made by Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin on December 10 that nuclear weapons of all kinds should be barred by agreement from West and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Should this proposal be accepted, a "neutral nuclear" zone would be created in the heart of Europe, separating the potential combatants—NATO and the Soviet bloc.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the third of eight articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1958"—What Should U.S. Do in a Changing World?—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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